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E_C_IVESUMMARY
Trouble with putting the finishing touches on the remodeled launch pad 39A
delayed the STS-32 mission 3 weeks past its scheduled mid-December 1989, liftoff. On
January 8, 1990, the launch was scrubbed due to weather. On the next day, January 9,
1990, the launch countdown proceeded on schedule, and Space Shuttle Columbia was
launched at 7:35 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). There were no significant
problems, major anomalies, or unplanned holds associated with the countdown and
launch. For the 10-day flight, Columbia was modified to carry more fuel and supplies,
and the crew performed medical and other experiments related to longer duration
missions.
On the first day in space, Columbia's robot arm, the Remote Manipulator System
(RMS), was given a thorough workout to ensure that it was ready to snare the Long
Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) 3 days later. Maneuvering engines were fired to
move Columbia laterally into LDEF's orbital plane and to slow the rate of closure on
LDEF. The ll-ton LDEF spacecraft, holding 57 experiments, was released into orbit by
STS-41C in April 1984. The LDEF orbited the earth over 32,000 times, travelling more
than 800 million miles.
At 8:20 a.m. EST on Flight Day (FD) 2, the 17,000-pound Synchronous
Communications Satellite (SYNCOM)-IV-5 was deployed from Columbia's payload bay.
SYNCOM was later successfully placed in a geosynchronous orbit using 2 burns of its
own booster rockets. Satellite performance has been excellent.
Over the next 2 days, Columbia crept nearer to LDEF. The STS-32 rendezvous
was one of the most complex the Space Shuttle had ever attempted, requiring 11 major
firings of Columbia's maneuvering engines. All burns were completed, and LDEF was
grappled by the RMS at 10:16 a.m. EST on January 12 at a distance of approximately
35 feet from Columbia. For the next 4-1/2 hours, LDEF was manipulated by the RMS
through 7 different positions while still photographs and videotapes were taken. The
photo survey documented the condition of the LDEF's experiments after almost 6 years
in orbit, in case the satellite sustained damage during reentry or could not be locked
into the payload bay and had to be reboosted to a higher altitude. Later in the
afternoon, the LDEF was guided into the open payload bay (with only 6" to spare on
either side of the bulky satellite). Once LDEF was perfectly aligned, 4 latches on the
payload bay walls and one on the keel locked it firmly into position for the ride home.
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Columbia was scheduled for a predawn landing at Edwards Air Force Base
(EAFB) on January 19; however, potential low visibility at touchdown due to developing
fog over the lakebed resulted in a NO-GO for landing. On January 20, 1990, at 1:35
a.m. local time, Columbia with LDEF made a smooth touchdown on the EAFB concrete
runway 22. The rare night landing was the third for the Space Shuttle. The nose of the
Space Shuttle was kept high at touchdown because of the 115-ton landing weight with
the LDEF aboard; this was almost 5 tons more than any previous shuttle at landing.
The landing delay made STS-32 the longest Space Shuttle mission to date, passing STS-
9's 10-day 7-hour mark.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and
Mission Quality (OSMQ) and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space
Shuttle flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a
change, or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control
Board (PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk
factors impacting STS-32 flight were also documented prior to the STS-32 Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and prior to the STS-32 Launch Minus Two
Day (L-2) Review (L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance
against safety risk factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ) and the Space Shuttle Program Director the
NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to the
Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1_ Scope
This report addresses STS-32 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that have an impact on this flight, and
factors that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I
for discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in seven sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a brief mission description, including launch data,
crew size, mission duration, launch and landing sites, and other
mission- and payload-related information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-32 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-32
flight.
Section 4 Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-32.
Section 5 Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-33 mission.
Section 6 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-28
mission.
Section 7 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-32
mission. Those IFAs that are considered to represent safety
risks will be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle
flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-32 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of STS-32 Mission
Trouble with putting the finishing touches on the remodeled launch pad 39A
delayed the STS-32 mission 3 weeks past its scheduled mid-December 1989, liftoff. On
January 8, 1990, the launch was scrubbed due to weather. On the next day, January 9,
1990, the launch countdown proceeded on schedule, and Space Shuttle Columbia was
launched at 7:35 a.m. EST. There were no significant problems, major anomalies, or
unplanned holds associated with the countdown and launch. For the 10-day flight,
Columbia was modified to carry more fuel and supplies, and the crew performed
medical and other experiments related to longer duration missions.
During ascent, Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) #3 lubrication oil outlet pressure rose
to 90 pounds per square inch (psi) and decreased to normal range at liftoff+ 9 minutes
(rain). This same anomaly was seen on another APU on STS-33. Frequency
Modulation (FM) system #1 was lost at liftoff +5 seconds (sec) (no power output), but
data was recovered about 10 sec later when switched to FM system #2. There was no
impact on mission operations.
On the first day in space, Columbia's robot arm, the Remote Manipulator System
(RMS), was given a thorough workout to ensure that it was ready to snare the Long
Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) 3 days later. Maneuvering engines were fired to
move Columbia laterally into the LDEFs orbital plane and to slow the rate of closure
on the LDEF. The ll-ton LDEF spacecraft, holding 57 experiments, was released into
orbit by STS-41C in April 1984. LDEF orbited the earth over 32,000 times, travelling
more than 800 million miles.
At 8:20 a.m. EST on Flight Day (FD) 2, the 17,000-pound (lb) Synchronous
Communications Satellite (SYNCOM)-IV-5 was deployed from Columbia's payload bay.
SYNCOM was later successfully placed in a geosynchronous orbit using 2 burns of its
own booster rockets. Three hours later, satellite performance was reported 100%
perfect.
During FD 2, the Protein Crystal Growth (PCG) experiment was found unpowered
during the night. The power cable had disconnected and was reconnected by the crew.
As a result, 2 of the proteins were damaged when the temperature rose 18.9".
Hydraulic system #1 circulation pump cycled ON at 23 and 28 hours (hr) Mission
Elapsed Time (MET) to recharge accumulator pressure due to a leaking unloader valve
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(a waiver was approved at the December 20, 1989,Program Requirements Control
Board (PRCB) for all 3 hydraulic systemunloader valves). The crew found water during
the Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH) canister change. The canister waswet, and water was
coming from an exit port of the humidity separator. The crew cleaned up the water and
switchedfrom humidity separator "B" to "A". Video of the humidity separator indicated
more water than reported by the crew; after viewing video, the Mission Control Center
(MCC) instructed the crew to perform free fluid cleanup.
On FD 3, the crew performed the Free Fluid Inflight Maintenance (IFM) Disposal
Water Cleanup Procedure. The amount of water wasapproximately 2 gallons. This
Inflight Anomaly (IFA) wasvery similar to that on STS-27(Corrective Action Request
(CAR) 27RF01) with the sameamount of free water. Humidity separator "A", which
had been switchedon instead of "B", had been performing nominally since its selection.
(Flight Rule 9-241calls for next Primary Landing Site (PLS) if lossof humidity control
occurs.) Water SprayBoiler (WSB) systems#2 and #3 indicated decay rates of
approximately 0.11 pounds per square inch per hour (psi/hr); allowable leakage is 0.06
psi/hr. It was unknown whether the decay was due to a water or Gaseous Nitrogen
(GN2) leak. If the leak was due to GN2 leak, there was no mission impact. If the decay
was due to a water leak, it was projected based on the current leak rate that 7.5 min of
APU operation would be available for the scheduled reentry. The reduced operating
time was due to an APU bearing temperature limit of 400°F.
On FD 4, January 12, 1990, all burns were completed, and LDEF was grappled by
the RMS at 10:16 a.m. EST at a distance of approximately 35 feet from Columbia. The
STS-32 rendezvous was one of the most complex the Space Shuttle had ever attempted,
requiring 11 major firings of Columbia's maneuvering engines. For the next 4-1/2 hr,
LDEF was manipulated by the RMS through 7 different positions while still photographs
and videotapes were taken. The photo survey documented the condition of the LDEF's
experiments after almost 6 years in orbit, in case the satellite sustained damage during
reentry or could not be locked into the payload bay and had to be reboosted to a higher
altitude. The initial survey indicated discoloration, holes on the panels, and
displacement of the Kapton film on panels H3 and H12. Later in the afternoon, the
LDEF was guided into the open payload bay (with only 6" to spare on either side of the
bulky satellite). Once LDEF was perfectly aligned, 4 latches on the payload bay walls
and 1 latch on the keel locked it firmly into position for the ride home.
Also on FD 4, a Fluids Experiment Assembly (FEA) pressure message was
received at the peak of the LDEF retrieval activities. The crew turned the FEA heater
power off. In troubleshooting the pressure loss, a hairline crack was found in sample
ampule #4 containing Indium. Flight Rules indicated that the FEA should remain
closed for the remainder of the mission due to the danger of broken glass particles in
the crew compartment. The FEA was manifested on STS-41D and STS-30. It is a
crystal growth system using microgravity to enhance the effects of floating zone materials
processing. The hydraulic system #1 accumulator pressure fell below 1960 pounds per
square inch absolute (psia) which caused the circulation pump to run and repressurize
the system. The system cycled 3 or 4 times in a 3-hr period. The circulation pump was
then operated for 4 hr in order to clear out any accumulator contamination.
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On FD 5, WSB systems #2 and #3 continued to decay, but slower than originally
predicted. Chances were considered likely that redlines would not be reached before
entry. Humidity separator "A" continued to operate nominally. During pre-sleep LiOH
changeout, separator "B" was inspected for free water; no water was found. IFM
procedures utilizing plastic trash bags were prepared to contain water if needed. IFM
procedures to remove the cracked ampule from the FEA (and continue with the
experiment) were reviewed. Safety concurred with implementation of the FEA sample
#4 ampule removal IFM. Because the ampule was cracked and no fragments were
visible, Safety was reasonably certain that the ampule would not fragment during the
removal process. Also, it was not believed that toxic gases were contained within the
FEA unit.
On FD 6, the FEA IFM procedure was implemented without any anomaly.
Sample #4 was replaced by sample #5. No debris was observed during the
replacement, and the experiment was reactivated. The crew was advised to monitor the
experiment every 10 min and terminate it on time. Eight ounces of water was found
around humidity separator "A" during pre-sleep activities. Water tanks were depressed,
and the situation was to be assessed at crew wakeup. Contingency IFM procedures were
uplinked to the crew. During LiOH canister changeout, the crew reported that no
excess water was observed at humidity separator "A". WSB regulator pressure decay had
slowed since the beginning of the mission. At the current decay rate, the pressures were
predicted to be above the redlines for the scheduled deorbit (system #2 at 17.5 psi and
system #3 at 14.7 psi). A problem also arose with an Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU). IMU #1 was deselected by Redundancy Management (RM) during crew sleep
due to Y-axis accelerometer transients. However, IMU #1 continued to track the
redundant set after deselection, and the crew was able to reselect IMU # 1 prior to IMU
alignment. After alignment, all 3 IMUs performed nominally, and no other problems
were observed.
On FD 7, IMU #1 was again deselected by RM. After reselection and
realignment by the crew, IMU #1 operated nominally. Water was reported coming out
of humidity separator "A". The unit was turned off, and crew cleanup was initiated.
The amount of free water was estimated to be about 2 cups. This small amount of free
water was suspected to be due to high crew activity levels during the day. Humidity
separator "A" was turned on again and operated nominally. The water tanks were
depressed for crew sleep. The crew placed a towel over the humidity separator "A" exit
to absorb any water during the night; a bag was placed over the towel to simplify
cleanup activities. FES aft zone heater system "B" failed when being enabled; system
"A" was selected and performed nominally.
The crew reported on FD 8 that after water dump they removed about 1 cup of
water from the bag around humidity separator "A". No water was found outside of the
bag. During FEA operations, the crew reported an overtemperature message, and the
power was turned off. They also reported that the surface temperature was not hot,
which contradicted the message. A transient data condition was suspected. It was
decided to power off for the rest of FD 8 and schedule again for the next day. The
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Ku-band return link was lost; the Ku-band forward link was still working good. A
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)-W problem was suspect.
On FD 9, a smoke alarm with siren was experienced from avionics bay 3A,
sensor 3A, which cleared itself after 5-6 sec. Playback data indicated no increase in
smoke concentration readings. A f'tre/smoke detection test was subsequently performed
successfully. It was, therefore, concluded that the alarm was most likely caused by an
intermittent fault in the smoke detection electronics. The same sensor annunciated a
second time during crew sleep, and the ground informed the crew that it would be
acceptable to open the associated circuit breaker if the alarm became a nuisance. The
Ku-band was turned over to TDRSS-E and provided a good return link. This isolated
the problem to TDRSS-W.
During crew sleep on FD 9, the vehicle began to roll nose-to-tail following a state
vector update. The 125-sec jet firing limit was exceeded, and the V-bar was violated.
Upon Acquisition of Signal (AOS), the ground instructed the crew to go to manual
Digital Autopilot (DAP). However, DAP error remained large; it cleared when the
crew went to free drift and then to manual discrete. A new state vector was uplinked
and the crew selected auto DAP. Data evaluation was conducted, and the attitude
remained nominal in auto DAP on the vernier Reaction Control System (RCS). It was
found that vehicle maneuvering resulted in approximately 50-1b propellant usage in the
Forward Reaction Control System (FRCS) and 90-1b usage in the right Orbital
Maneuvering System (OMS) due to interconnect. Only vernier jets were fired during
the vehicle maneuvers. Vernier jet F5R fired for 203 sec and exceeded the certification
firing time limit of 125 sec. No jet or structural concern existed because of the
certification exceedance.
Several more false alarms from avionics bay 3A, sensor 3A, circuitry prompted the
decision on FD 10 to pull the circuit breaker. The plan for reentry was to close this
circuit breaker for smoke detection redundancy in all avionics bays. Should an alarm be
generated from this sensor during reentry, the crew was to verify the smoke
concentration on the onboard display before discharge of the fire extinguishing bottle.
Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) was a NO-GO for landing on January 19, FD 10, due
to potential low visibility.
At 1:35 a.m. local time on FD 11, January 20, 1990, Columbia with LDEF made a
smooth touchdown on EAFB concrete runway 22. The rare night landing was the third
for the Space Shuttle. The nose of the shuttle was kept high at touchdown because of
the ll5-ton landing weight with the LDEF aboard; this was almost 5 tons more at
landing than any previous Space Shuttle. The landing delay made STS-32 the longest
Space Shuttle mission to date, passing STS-9's 10-day 7-hr mark.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: January 9, 1990
• Launch Time: 7:35 a.m. EST
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39A
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 33
• TAL Site: Ben Guerir, Morocco
• Alternate TAL Site: Moron, Spain
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Runway 22
• Landing Date: January 20, 1990
• Landing Time: 4:35 a.m. EST
• Mission Duration: 10 Days, 21 Hours
• Crew Size: 5
• Inclination: 28.5 Degrees
• Altitude: 190 Nautical Miles/Direct Insertion
• Orbiter: OV-102 (9) Columbia
• SSMEs: (1) #2024, (2) #2022, (3) #2028
• ET: ET-032
• SRBs: BI-035
• SRMs: RSRM Flight Set #8
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OV- 102 COLUMBIA
ENGINE #2024 #2022 #2028
POWERHEAD #2026 #2022 #4005
MCC* #2013 #2022 #2018
NOZZLE #4006 #4002 #4012
CONTROLLER F5 F15 F21
FASCOS* #01 #22 #21
HPFTP* #6007 #4102R 1 #2126
LPFTP* #2131 #2024 #2026R2
HPOTP* #4107R 1 #2305R 1 #2323R 1
LPOTP* #4206 #2104R 1 # 2027R 1
* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Payload Data
Payload Bay:
- Synchronous Communications Satellite (SYNCOM)-IV-5
- Interim Operational Contamination Monitor (IOCM)
- Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) Retrieval
Middeck:
American Hight Echocardiograph (AFE)
Fluids Experiment Assembly (FEA)
Protein Crystal Growth (PCG)
Characterization of Neurospora Circadian Rhythms (CNCR) in Space
Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) Calibration Test
IMAX Camera System
Latitude Longitude Locator (L3)
Mesoscale Lightning Experiment (MLE)
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2.4 LDEF Payload Recovery
The Payload Operations Working Group (POWG) reviewed operational
requirements for rendezvous, the photo survey scenario, planned operations during
approach and grappling of LDEF, and post-berthing flight constraints on the Orbiter so
as not to compromise the data collected over the past 5.5 years. All of these operations
were actively worked by the flight crew and the appropriate flight planners. The crew
was heavily involved in testing and practicing the maneuvers to accomplish rendezvous,
grapple the LDEF, maneuver the spacecraft to obtain photo coverage, and dock the
spacecraft into the Orbiter bay.
One concern related to the scenarios for being unable to deploy SYNCOM-IV-5
by any means, or where a SYNCOM failure would make deployment meaningless. The
flight rules currently in place precluded returning with both LDEF and SYNCOM
because the combination would make the Orbiter overweight for landing. There is a
high probability that an overweight landing would result in structural damage to the
Orbiter. A decision was made at the December 13, 1989, STS-32 Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) Action Item Review not to attempt return with both LDEF and
SYNCOM.
Fortunately, this situation did not arise. The SYNCOM satellite was deployed as
planned, LDEF was retrieved from orbit, and Columbia returned safely to Earth with its
mission successfully accomplished.
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-32 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-32 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-32 flight. The list indicates the
section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item is addressed,
the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description of the item,
and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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ITEM COMMENT
Section 4: Resolved Safety Risk Factors
Integration 2 Orbiter/External Tank
(ET) separation bolt
exceeded torque
specification.
During Orbiter/ET mechanical mate,
the Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) aft
separation bolt exceeded the torque
specification. The Left-Hand (LH) side
LH2 bolt exceeded the torque
specification during final torque
operation. New bolt and nut were
installed and checked satisfactorily.
No Orbiter/ET separation bolt
anomalies were reported on STS-32.
However, postflight inspection found the
Right-Hand (RH) stop bolt slightly
deformed (but not bent) on the
centering ring of the forward ET
attach/separation assembly.
Deformations or flat spots similar to
those seen on STS-32 have been found
on other flight and qualification bolts.
Integration 5 Mercury Aerospace
fasteners failed lot testing.
Mercury Aerospace fasteners failed lot
testing for Spacelab hardware [non-
uniform grain size (hot formed) and
surface irregularities]. An alert was
prepared for the Government, Industry
Data Exchange Program (GIDEP). The
Inspector General confiscated the
defective hardware, and Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) Materials and
Processes (M&P) tested the bolts. It
was determined that the type of failures
found in the lot tested could cause stress
rupture in the part; however, MSFC did
not consider this to be a problem
because most of the applications were
not in the high-temperature area.
No anomalies attributed to Mercury
Aerospace fasteners were reported on
STS-32. However, during postflight
disassembly of the STS-32 Solid Rocket
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ITEM
Section 4: Resolved Safety Risk Factors
Integration 5
(Continued)
COMMENT
Boosters (SRBs), a broken fastener was
found in the LH upper strut fairing or
"milk can". Proper fastener material
properties and heat treatment were
confirmed by analysis of the failed
fastener, and material analysis concluded
that the failure was due to torsional
overload. The failed fastener was not
specifically identified as a Mercury
Aerospace part.
Orbiter 9 Unloader valves on
hydraulic systems #1, #2,
and #3 are leaking above
the allowable leak rate.
Prior to this flight, it was known that all
3 OV-102 unloader valves were
experiencing out-of-specification leakage.
Hydraulic systems #1, #2, and #3
unloader valves were leaking above the
allowable leak rate of 30 pounds per
square inch/hour (psi/hr), as high as
64 psi/hr, in the operational range from
2300 to 2400 pounds per square inch
(psi). System #1 unloader valve was
also leaking above the allowable leak
rate in the operational range from 1870
to 2050 psi, at a rate of 402 psi/hr
versus the 20 psi/hr allowable rate.
Continuous leakdown of accumulator
pressure results in excessive run time
required from the circulation pump.
Excessive pump run time would require
a large amount of consumables from the
fuel cells because the electrical
circulation pump draws approximately
2000 watts.
The leaking condition was waived for
1 flight, STS-32, with the understanding
that hydraulic accumulator pressures
would be closely monitored during
prelaunch activities. However,
approximately 1 hr prior to circulation
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ITEM
Section 4: Resolved Safety_ Risk Factors
Orbiter 9
(Continued)
SRB 1 Integrated Electronic
Assembly (IEA) test
failures.
COMMENT
pump #2 deactivation during the launch
scrub turnaround (scrub due to weather
conditions), there was a significant
increase in unloader valve #2 cycling.
Approximately 45 minutes (rain) after
deactivation of circulation pump #2, all
bootstrap fluid pressure was lost.
Because of a similar anomaly on STS-28,
the decision was made to replace the
hydraulic system #2 unloader valve prior
to the STS-32 launch. The hydraulic
system #1 unloader valve also had failed
during testing; it was removed, replaced,
and successfully retested. It is believed
that contamination in the unloader valve
pilot seat area caused the leakage
problems.
The hydraulic systems operated
satisfactorily for the STS-32 flight.
While performing normal receiving
inspection electrical tests at United
Space Boosters, Inc. (USBI), the aft
IEA, Serial Number (S/N) 55, failed the
power bus isolation test due to a hard
short of the power bus "A" return to the
chassis; resistance to chassis should be
160,000 ohms minimum. The unit had
tested "good" during the vendor's
Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP). The
unit was sent back to Bendix where it
was determined that one bundle of 49
wires was wedged between a standoff
and another wire bundle. This had
caused the power cable to rub against
the standoff, and a short-to-ground
resulted. Three wires in the bundle of
49 carry Criticality 1 functions; the other
46 wires have no flight-critical effect.
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ITEM
Section 4: Resolved Safety Risk Factors
SRB 1
(Continued)
Section 5:
Orbiter 1
STS-33 Inflight Anomalies
Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) #1 lube oil output
pressure was high.
COMMENT
It was determined that this configuration
was allowable in the applicable drawing
and the problem was, therefore, not just
the result of technician error. Both
STS-32 aft lEAs were removed in the
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC). IEAs
S/N 29 and 49 were inspected for
adequate wire bundle clearance prior to
installation in STS-32. No IEA
anomalies associated with wire bundle
shorts to ground were reported on
STS-32. However, during postflight
disassembly, the right IEA connector
was found damaged. Two pins were
bent, probably during mating of the
cable to the lEA. The pins were wired
spares; therefore, they were not checked
out during final functional testing after
final mate of cables to the IEA.
On STS-33, APU #1 experienced higher
than normal lube oil pressure during
ascent. Pressure peaked at
approximately 85 psi, 25 psi higher than
normal. The pressure returned to
normal just prior to Main Engine Cutoff
(MECO). Two waivers, one for high
APU gearbox delta pressure and the
other for high APU gearbox blanket
pressure, were approved prior to STS-33
launch.
It was found that the seal cavity pressure
was higher than the gearbox pressure
due to a procedural error, thereby
allowing hydrazine seepage into the
gearbox. A wax substance,
pentaerythritoral, forms when hydrazine
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mixes with the lube oil. This substance
goes back into solution between 175-
200°F, which is the nominal APU
operating temperature.
A similar anomaly was observed on
STS-32. APU #3 experienced slightly
high lube oil output pressure during
ascent. The outlet pressure rose to
90 psi, and then decreased to a normal
pressure range at L+9 minutes when the
APU reached full operating
temperature.
Orbiter 5 Hydraulic systems # 1 and
#2 accumulator ascent
pressure locked-up low.
During STS-33 ascent, hydraulic systems
#1 and #2 accumulator pressure locked-
up low. This was similar to a problem
on STS-26 and STS-29 where priority
valves #1 and #2 experienced low
reseats at APU shutdown. Lockups had
been repeatable during OV-103 flights
since reflight and showed no sign of
further degradation. There was no
immediate system concern; therefore,
these valves were allowed to fly as is for
STS-33 even though they were known to
be out-of-specification. It is believed
that the valves were set low during
acceptance testing at the vendor, or they
changed with time.
This condition was waived with the
understanding that for 1 flight, STS-32,
accumulator pressures would be closely
monitored during prelaunch activities.
Hydraulic systems #1 and #2 also
exhibited anomalous operation on
STS-32 during launch scrub turnaround
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(scrub due to weather conditions).
However, the hydraulic systems operated
satisfactorily for the STS-32 flight. (See
the discussion in Section 4/Orbiter 9
above in this section of the Mission
Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report.)
Orbiter 9 Flash Evaporator System
(FES) "B" outlet
temperature oscillation.
During STS-33 deorbit preparation,
when FES B was reconfigured from the
"PRI B ON" to the "PRI B GPC"
position, it shut down because FES "B"
was above the temperature limits. This
was due to the inability of FES "B" to
bring control band temperatures within
shutdown logic limitations. A similar
occurrence was experienced on STS-29.
This anomaly was believed to have been
caused by a tolerance buildup in the
lead/lag times of controller B and its
3 temperature sensors.
No similar anomaly was reported on
STS-32. However, FES topping duct B
string heater failed on day 7 of the
STS-32 mission. FES topping duct
heater A was selected and operated
nominally for the remainder of the
mission.
Orbiter 11 Hydraulic system #2 Water
Spray Boiler (WSB)
Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2)
leakage was out-of-
specification.
During STS-33 on-orbit preparations, the
WSB for hydraulic system #2
demonstrated excessive GN2 leakage. A
similar anomaly was experienced on
STS-29 WSB #1.
On STS-32, GN2 regulator pressure on
WSB boilers #2 and #3 indicated
pressure decay rates of approximately
0.11 psi/hr over a 16-hr period; the
allowable specification decay rate is
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0.06 psi/hr. However, the decay rate
approached zero by the end of the
mission. It is believed that the pressure
decays were due to GN2 relief valves not
being fully seated and not due to water
leaks. The poppets in the relief valves
were removed and replaced. GN2 24-hr
decay check on system #2 indicated
leakage of 0.06 psi/hr that was just
within the specification limits.
SRB 1 Holddown Post (HDP)
anomalies.
Orbiter accelerometer readings at
STS-33 SRB ignition indicated a
holddown bolt anomaly. The launch
film showed the stud at HDP #3 hung-
up, similar to the occurrence on STS-34.
The stud extended approximately 8" and
contacted the aft skirt stud hole wall.
This may have caused a piece of the
epon shim to pull loose and separate
from the skirt foot. An area of epon
shim material (approximately 34 in 2) on
the bottom of the right SRB HDP #3
was observed falling off during the
launch. A Rockwell International (RI)
evaluation of this type of anomaly
concluded that the probability of shim
material ricocheting and impacting the
vehicle is extremely remote as the
primary forces acting on the shim
particles are gravity, plume
impingement, and aspiration. Postflight
inspection of the RH aft skirt found that
it had been broached on the aft side of
the HDP #3 bolt hole. Thread
impressions were also visible on the
forward side of the same hole. HDP
broaching occurred on several previous
flights, most recently on STS-34.
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No HDP stud hangups were reported on
STS-32. However, a large amount of
debris (approximately 7 pounds) escaped
from the HDP Debris Containment
System (DCS) during STS-32 Liftoff.
This was directly attributed to removal
of the frangible link from the DCS.
SRB 2 LH External Tank
Attachment (ETA) Ring
IEA end cover and cable
sooted.
Upon removal of the LH IEA covers
from STS-33, sooting was noted on 16
cables and interior painted surfaces of
the end cover. Examination of the cable
jacket indicated no heating effects (no
erosion, clouding of material, or
degradation). It was determined that
the gap in the RTV-133 sealant allowed
hot gases to enter the ETA ring and the
IEA cable areas through the aft side of
the IEA end cover.
The gases entered at the aft side of the
end cover, traveled across the wire
bundles, and exited through the opposite
(forward) side of the end cover. This
was evidenced by the heaviest sooting
deposits on the aft side of the lEA end
cover and the flow pattern. The
direction of hot gas flow entering the
end cover indicated that this condition
occurred during reentry or descent. The
RTV-133 material was missing at the
area of soot entry and exit.
All cables functioned properly during the
mission. Insufficient heat was present to
damage the cables or impair the cable
function. Corrective action consisted of
a Field Engineering Change (FEC)
effective for STS-32, STS-36, STS-31,
and STS-35. Engineering Change
Proposal (ECP)-2670 will make this
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change to the closeout procedures
permanent. It clarifies the Thermal
Protection System (TPS) closeout,
assuring proper closeout and preventing
anomaly recurrence.
Minor sooting of the ETA ring aft lEA
middle cover was found on STS-32; lEA
functioning was not affected. The
sooting was attributed to installation of
larger Hi-Lok fasteners, preventing
proper fit of the cover.
KSC 1 Improper installation of
cable connector assemblies.
During STS-33 postflight assessment,
2 cable connectors were found
incorrectly installed, and 2 ground straps
were loose due to omitted washers. The
RH forward skirt Range Safety System
(RSS) Ground Support Equipment
(GSE) cable [Radio Frequency (RF)
signal to the Integrated Receiver/
Decoder (IRD)] was not fully seated on
its mating connector at the forward
feedthrough. The connector was
engaged only 3/4 of a turn; 3 1/2 turns
are required for full engagement. The
connector was lockwired correctly. The
connector insert showed signs of
moisture and contained KSNA debris.
This cable is not used in flight, but is
used during range safety ground
checkout. The LH upper strut
separation ordnance connector was
finger-loose. The connector was
lockwired correctly. The jam nut was
retorqued to determine the relationship
of the lockwire to the properly-torqued
connector. Slack in the lockwire
indicated that the connector had not
been properly torqued prior to lockwire
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installation. Two ground straps located
between the RH SRB aft lEA bracket
and the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
were loose. The ground strap fasteners
bottomed out due to omitted washers.
Some washers had not been installed on
the fasteners on the forward end of the
lEA, but those fasteners had not
bottomed out and the ground straps
were not loose. All 4 bolts were
torqued properly (125-150 inch-pound
(in-lb)). The LH brackets had washers
installed.
During STS-32 postflight disassembly, 2
bent pins were found on the right SRB
lEA connector. This was considered to
have occurred during mating of the
cable to the IEA. The pins were wired
spares that were not checked out during
functional testing after final cable mate.
Section 6:STS-28 Inflight Anomalies
Orbiter 13 Hydraulic system #2
unloader valve operated
out-of-specification.
During STS-28/OV-102 prelaunch, the
unloader valve cycled when the
accumulator pressure reached 2350 psi;
this is higher than the 2100-psi
specification limit. During the mission,
accumulator pressure dropped sharply
from 2500 to 2350 psi, and the unloader
valve cycled. Valve leakage or striction
were considered possible causes of this
anomaly. The MC284-0438-0001
configuration unloader valve has a
history of leakage. The Orbiter Project
Office (OPO) directed replacement of
-0001 valves with -0002 valves on an
attrition basis. KSC removed and
replaced this valve; it was returned to
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the vendor for failure analysis. Leak
check of the replacement valve was
satisfactory.
On STS-32, OV-102 hydraulic systems
#1 and #2 unloader valves also
experienced similar anomalous operation
during prelaunch. See the discussion in
Section 4/Orbiter 9 above in this section
of the MSE Report for details.
SRM 1 Gask-O-Seal void found
during postflight inspection.
During postflight disassembly and
inspection of the STS-28 right SRM
igniter, a small depression was found at
210 ° on the inner primary seal on the aft
face of the inner Gask-O-Seal
(360H005B). The crown of the seal was
depressed inward and measured
approximately 0.100" long
circumferentially by 0.025" radially; it
extended across the crown width. It
appeared that a possible subsurface void
may have existed in the inner primary
seal prior to flight. There was no
evidence of a leak path in the putty
(primary seal not pressurized). The joint
passed preflight low- and high-pressure
leak test. No blowby past the inner
primary seal or pressure path to the seal
was found. However, leak test may not
be sufficient if an indentation exists in
the seal. The joint gap is predicted to
open 3.5 mils at the outer gasket, 3.0
mils at the inner gasket. Indentation, if
present, may not dynamically track the
gap opening on pressurization, and the
leak test is not flight dynamic.
Additionally, crown indentations were
also discovered during disassembly of
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new gaskets on Development Motor
(DM)-9 and Qualification Motor
(QM)-6. Subsurface void was found in
both cases; contamination was also
present on DM-9.
Standard Nondestructive Inspection
(NDI) techniques, such as X-ray, cannot
reliably detect subsurface voids. Current
known gasket defects are detectable by
visual and touch inspection at
disassembly. Indentation is easily
detectable after gasket removal. It
should be noted that indentations have
never been detected on reused gaskets.
Corrective action was initiated to
develop an inspection technique to
detect subsurface voids: design a
plexiglass fixture for seal test;
reinvestigate N-ray and x-ray; and
investigate ultrasonics and background
scatter.
For the STS-32 flight, the left and right
SRM igniter seals were inspected and
replaced. All 360L008 seals were reused
and had flown previous missions; one
was flown 3 times. They passed
thorough visual and touch inspection
upon removal from the compressed
state; no indentations were detected.
The seals passed all certification
inspection criteria and leak tests.
Resiliency tests demonstrated that a
minimum crown height of 0.021" will
meet a 1.4 tracking factor at Launch
Commit Criteria (LCC) temperatures.
All STS-32 igniter gaskets met the crown
height requirement of 0.021-0.031".
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However, SRM Gask-O-Seal anomalies
were also reported on STS-32. During
postflight inspection of the right SRM
Safe and Arm (S&A) gasket, a small
depression was found in the crown of
the secondary seal aft face. Small raised
areas or bulges were also found on the
cushion and in the valleys of the igniter
inner Gask-O-Seal. (See Section 7,
SRM 1 and SRM 2 for more details.)
3-14 STS-32 Postflight Edition
SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-32 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a listing of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-32. These items were reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to resolution is based on findings resulting
from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP) and Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) reviews (or other special panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety
assessment arrived at in accordance with actions taken, efforts conducted, and
tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve each specific problem.
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RESOLVED STS-32 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
INTEGRATION
1
2
3
4
5
Unitrode diodes alert.
Orbiter/External Tank separation bolt exceeded torque specification.
Liquid Oxygen 2" poppet vented.
Flasher software problems.
Mercury Aerospace fasteners failed lot testing.
PAGE
4-4
4-5
4-6
4-7
4-9
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
17" disconnect main actuator drive link bearing cracks.
Loose connector backshells.
Brakes locked during carbon brake system verification testing.
Water deluge of STS-32/OV-102.
Dome heat shield blanket damage.
Elevon tile improperly bonded.
Nose Landing Gear slapdown load.
OV-102 has a history of high hydrogen concentrations during tanking.
Unloader valves on hydraulic systems #1, #2, and #3 are leaking
above allowable leak rate.
Suspect solder joints in Master Event Controllers.
4-11
4-11
4-12
4-13
4-14
4-15
4-15
4-17
4-18
4-19
SSME
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Engine #2022 overangulation.
Crack found on fuel preburner diffuser.
Engine #2024 Main Combustion Chamber hot wall depressed area.
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump exceeds 50% fleet leader.
Engine #2029 heat shield debris.
Main injector Liquid Oxygen post hazard Factor of Safety.
Potential for residual recast in critical zone of injector Liquid Oxygen
post No. 8, row 13, engine #2022.
4-21
4-21
4-22
4-23
4-24
4-25
4-27
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SECTION 4 INDEX (Continued)
RESOLVED STS-32 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
SRB
Integrated Electronic Assembly test failures.
Solid Rocket Booster Thrust Vector Control tilt channel D driver
current dropout.
Thrust Vector Control fuel filter bowl drain cap hazard upgrade.
Fuel Isolation Valve isolation mount washer.
SRM
1
2
3
4
5
Colocated fretting of Solid Rocket Motor tang and clevis at the right-
hand forward field joint on STS-32.
Intermittent paint flaking on left-hand center aft Solid Rocket Motor
segment on STS-32.
Left Solid Rocket Motor aft joint heater experienced high voltage
readings.
Voids in Solid Rocket Motor forward dome insulation.
Nozzle throat erosion.
GFE
1
2
Remote Manipulator System fails to stop.
Concern for flammability of off-the-shelf camcorder case.
KSC
1 Crew emergency escape breathing device, known as "SCRAM",
generates nearly pure oxygen about the heads of the crew.
PAGE
4-28
4-28
4-29
4-31
4-32
4-33
4-33
4-34
4-35
4-37
4-37
4-39
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SECTION 5
STS-33 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (WAs) arising from the
OV-103/STS-33 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
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SECTION 5 INDEX
STS-33 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
INTEGRATION
1
RISK
FACTOR
Space Shuttle Main Engine #2107 nozzle bluing.
PAGE
5-3
ORBITER
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 lube oil output pressure was high.
Cabin air leak through the Waste Collection System.
Reaction Control System FlU pressure transducer failure.
Commanders' airspeed mach indicator out-of-specification.
Hydraulic systems #1 and #2 accumulator ascent pressure locked-up
low.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Oxygen tank #1 had a
sticky Check Valve.
Forward attach point system A and system B connectors found
damaged.
"Y" Star Tracker door thermal blanket detached.
Flash Evaporator System B outlet temperature oscillation.
Erratic temperature indication from Auxiliary Power Units #1 and #3
bypass line "A".
Hydraulic system #2 Water Spray Boiler Gaseous Nitrogen leakage
was out-of-specification.
5-4
5-5
5-5
5-6
5-6
5-7
5-7
5-8
5-9
5-10
5-10
SRB
1
2
Holddown Post anomalies.
Left-hand External Tank Attachment ring Integrated Electronic
Assembly end cover and cable sooted.
5-11
5-13
KSC
1 Improper installation of cable connector assemblies. 5-14
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SECTION 6
STS-28 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the STS-28
mission (previous flight of OV-102). Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk
acceptance information and rationale are provided.
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SECTION 6 INDEX
STS-28 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
PAGE
SRB
1
Pilot seat moved during ascent. 6-3
Vernier thruster F5R annunciated fail leak. 6-4
Nose Landing Gear Weight-On-Wheels indication failed off. 6-5
Fuel Cell #1 Hydrogen flow erratic. 6-5
Abort light failure. 6-5
Forward Reaction Control System F5L heater failed on. 6-6
Main Bus C utility outlet #1 teleprinter short circuit (teleprinter cable 6-6
anomaly).
Auxiliary Power Unit isolation valve talkback failure. 6-7
Environmental Control and Life Support System Freon Coolant Loop 6-7
low flow rate.
Right-hand Orbital Maneuvering System fuel quantity gage reading 6-8
high.
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 test line temperature read high. 6-9
STS-28 crew experienced eye irritation. 6-9
Hydraulic system #2 unloader valve operated out-of-specification. 6-10
Excessive body flap deflection during ascent. 6-10
Orbiter structural heat damage. 6-11
Crew reported a loud thump/thud at first OPS-1 transition. 6-11
Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve #1 showed sluggish response. 6-13
Early asymmetrical boundary layer encounter resulted in anomalous 6-14
aerosurface movement, usage of more than a normal amount of
Reaction Control System propellant, and excessive Thermal Protection
System damage.
Umbilical foam detached from the External Tank Liquid Oxygen 17" 6-14
disconnect.
SRM
1
Loose bolts on the left Solid Rocket Booster External Tank
Attachment ring.
Gask-O-Seal void found during postflight inspection.
6-16
6-17
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SECTION 7
STS-32 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (WAs) arising from the
OV-102/STS-32 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
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SECTION 7 INDEX
STS-32 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Auxiliary Power Unit #3 lubrication oil outlet pressure high.
Right-hand Orbital Maneuvering System "no-back" device moved
during ascent.
Gaseous Oxygen Flow Control Valve # 2 opened sluggishly.
Humidity separator "B" water bypass.
Humidity separator "A" water bypass.
Flash Evaporator System topping duct "B" string heater failure.
Inertial Measurement Unit #1 was deselected by Redundancy
Management due to Y-axis transients.
Hydraulic systems #1 and #2 unloader valves exhibited anomalous
operation.
Water Spray Boiler systems #2 and #3 regulator pressure decaying
slowly.
Avionics bay #3A smoke detector transient alarm and associated
lights.
Waste water dump line/nozzle blockage.
Backup Flight Computer General Purpose Computer errors -
Input/Output terminal B.
Water Spray Boiler #3 controller "A" overcooling.
Main Propulsion System Liquid Hydrogen outboard fill and drain
relief valve leak.
Right-hand stop bolt was found slightly deformed on the STS-32
centering ring of the forward External Tank attach/separation
assembly.
Pilot seat down drive motor did not operate.
PAGE
7-4
7-5
7-6
7-6
7-7
7-7
7-8
7-9
7-10
7-11
7-12
7-12
7-13
7-14
7-14
7-16
SSME
Main Combustion Chamber aft end debond found on engine #2022.
Gouges found in the Main Combustion Chamber throat area of
engines #2024 and #2028.
7-17
7-18
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SECTION 7 INDEX - CONTINUED
STS-32 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
SRB
1
2
3
RISK
FACTOR
Upper strut Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer cover partially
missing.
External Tank Attachment ring aft Instrument and Electronics
Assembly cover sooted.
Broken fastener found on STS-32 left-hand Solid Rocket Booster
upper strut fairing.
PAGE
7-19
7-20
7-20
SRM
1
2
Right Solid Rocket Motor Safe and Arm gasket depression on
secondary seal.
Raised areas found on the igniter inner Gask-O-Seal.
7-21
7-22
Review of the External Tank separation photos from STS-32 showed
4 Spray-On Foam Insulation divots in the bipod area.
7-23
KSC
1 Right-hand aft Integrated Electronic Assembly bent pins. 7-24
MCC
State vector uplink incident. 7-25
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SECTION 8
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
a°m°
AC
ACA
AFB
AFE
AMOS
AOS
APU
ARS
ATP
ATVC
BFC
BFS
BITE
CA
CAR
CD
CEI
CMD
CNCR
CR
CV
D&C
DAP
DAR
DCS
DM
DoD
DR
DWV
Before Noon (Ante Meridiem)
Alternating Current
Annunciator Control Assembly
Air Force Base
American Flight Echocardiograph
Air Force Maui Optical Sighting
Acquisition of Signal
Auxiliary Power Unit
Air Revitalization System
Acceptance Test Procedure
Ascent Thrust Vector Control
Backup Flight Computer
Backup Flight System
Built-In-Test Equipment
California
Corrective Action Request
Countdown
Configuration End Item
Command
Characterization of Neurospora Circadian Rhythms
Change Request
Check Valve
Display and Control
Digital Autopilot
Deviation Approval Request
Debris Containment System
Demonstration Motor
Development .Motor
Department of Defense
Discrepancy Report
Dielectric Withstanding Voltage
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EAFB
ECLSS
ECP
EMI
EPDM
EST
ET
ET/SEP
ETA
F
FAR
FASCOS
FC
FCL
FCS
FCV
FD
FDA
FEA
FEC
FES
FIV
FM
FMEA
FMEA/CIL
FOS
fps
FRCS
FRR
ft
g
GFI
GH2
GIDEP
GN2
GOX
GPC
GSE
Edwards Air Force Base
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Engineering Change Proposal
Electromagnetic Interference
Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer
Eastern Standard Time
External Tank
External Tank/Separation
External Tank Attachment
Fahrenheit
Federal Aviation Regulation
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Fuel Cell
Freon Coolant Loop
Flight Control System
Flow Control Valve
Flight Day
Fault Detection and Annunciation
Fluids Experiment Assembly
Field Engineering Change
Flash Evaporator System
Fuel Isolation Valve
Frequency Modulation
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety
Feet Per Second
Forward Reaction Control System
Flight Readiness Review
Feet
Gravitational Acceleration
Ground Fault Interrupt
Gaseous Hydrogen
Government, Industry Data Exchange Program
Gaseous Nitrogen
Gaseous Oxygen
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
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H2
HCF
HDP
HEX
HPFTP
HPOTP
HPU
HR
hr
Hz
i/o
IBM
mA
IFA
IFM
IMU
in-lb
INCO
INTG
IOCM
IOM
lOP
IPL
IRD
JSC
KSC
L-2
L3
lb
lb/hr
LCC
LDEF
LH
LH2
LiOH
LO2
LOX
Hydrogen
High-Cycle Fatigue
Holddown Post
Heat Exchanger
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hydraulic Power Unit
Hazard Report
Hour
Hertz
Input/Output
International Business Machines
Instrument and Electronics Assembly
Integrated Electronic Assembly
Inflight Anomaly
Inflight Maintenance
Inertial Measurement Unit
Inch-Pound
Integrated Communications Officer
Integration
Interim Operational Contamination Monitor
Input/Output Module
Input-Output Processor
Initial Program Load
Integrated Receiver/Decoder
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Launch Minus 2 Days (Review)
Latitude Longitude Locator
Pound
Pounds Per Hour
Launch Commit Criteria
Long Duration Exposure Facility
Left Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Lithium Hydroxide
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Oxygen
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LPFTP
LPOTP
LSFR
M&P
MADS
MCC
MCIU
MDM
MDSSC
ME
MEC
MECO
MET
min
MLE
MLG
MLP
MMMSS
MMU
MPS
MRB
MSD
MSE
msec
MSFC
NASA
NDE
NDI
NLG
NPSP
NSRS
0 2
OMI
OMRS
OMRSD
OMS
OPF
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Launch Site Flow Review
Materials and Processes
Modular Auxiliary Data System
Main Combustion Chamber
Mission Control Center
Manipulator Controller Interface Unit
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company
Main Engine
Main Engine Controller, Master Event Controller
Main Engine Cutoff
Mission Elapsed Time
Minute
Mesoscale Lightning Experiment
Main Landing Gear
Mobile Launch Platform
Martin Marietta Manned Space Systems
Mass Memory Unit
Main Propulsion System
Material Review Board
Mission Support Directorate
Mission Safety Evaluation
Millisecond
Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Non-Destructive Evaluation
Nondestructive Inspection
Nose Landing Gear
Net Positive Static Pressure
NASA Safety Reporting System
Oxygen
Operations and Maintenance Instruction
Operational Maintenance Requirements Specification
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Orbiter Processing Facility
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OPO
ORBI
OSMQ
OV
OZ
PCG
PLS
POWG
ppm
PR
PRACA
PRCB
PRSD
psi
psi/hr
psia
psid
Q
QD
QM
RCN
RCS
RF
RH
RI
RM
RMS
RPC
RSRM
RSS
RTLS
RTV
S/N
S&A
sec
SIP
SOFI
SPF
Orbiter Project Office
Orbiter
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Orbiter Vehicle
Ounce
Protein Crystal Growth
Primary Landing Site
Payload Operations Working Group
Parts Per Million
Problem Reports
Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
Program Requirements Control Board
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Per Hour
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
Dynamic Pressure
Quick Disconnect
Qualification Motor
Requirements Change Notice
Reaction Control System
Radio Frequency
Right Hand
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Remote Manipulator System
Remote Power Controller
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Range Safety System
Return to Launch Site
Room-Temperature Vulcanizate
Serial Number
Safe and Arm
Seconds
Strain Isolator Pad
Spray-On Foam Insulation
Software Production Facility
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SRB
SRM
SSC
SSME
SSRP
SYNCOM
TAL
TDRSS
TPS
TVC
U/N
USBI
VAB
WCS
WOW
WPAFB
WSB
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Stennis Space Center
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Synchronous Communication Satellite
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Thermal Protection System
Thrust Vector Control
Unit Number
United Space Boosters, Inc.
Vehicle Assembly Building
Waste Collection System
Weight-On-Wheels
Wright Patterson Air Force Base
Water Spray Boiler
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